Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in China on Tuesday evening for a two-day visit centred on talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, as Moscow and Beijing draw closer amid war, sanctions and an increasingly fractured global order.
Putin’s visit is the second face-to-face meeting he has held with Xi in less than a year and coincides with the 25th anniversary of the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, the agreement that formalised ties between Russia and China following decades of ideological rivalry and mutual suspicion.
Recommended Stories
list of 4 itemsend of list
The visit comes just days after United States President Donald Trump left Beijing following his own two-day visit to the Chinese capital for meetings with Xi.
Both Moscow and Beijing are navigating tricky relations with Washington, with analysts saying the unpredictability of Trump’s foreign policy has had the effect of pushing Russia and China even closer together.
Their deepening partnership also comes against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, mounting tensions around Iran, and disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz – a crisis that has rattled global energy markets and renewed Beijing’s concerns over the security of its oil and gas supplies.
With one of the world’s most strategically vital waterways under threat, China has increasingly turned towards Russia as a reliable overland energy supplier.
Analysts say Xi’s decision to host Trump and Putin within the space of a week is no coincidence, reflecting Beijing’s attempt to cast itself as a trusted actor in an increasingly fragmented and volatile world order.
How have China-Russia relations changed over the decades?
China and Russia have long occupied a complicated place in each other’s histories. Once bound together through communist ideology and shared opposition to Western capitalism, the Soviet Union and Maoist China later became bitter rivals, with tensions along their 4,300km (2,670-mile) border bringing the two countries close to conflict during the Cold War.
However, that border has since transformed from a frontier of insecurity into one of strategic cooperation and trade.
Neither Xi nor Putin is a frequent international traveller. Putin is the subject of an International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant over the war in Ukraine, while Xi rarely leaves China other than for carefully choreographed state visits. But both leaders have invested heavily in maintaining personal ties with each other.
The two have repeatedly called each other “friends”, and their relationship has deepened, particularly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which pushed Moscow further into international isolation and forced the Kremlin to look southeastwards for trade amid Western sanctions.
“Russia and China look confidently towards the future,” Putin said in remarks carried by Russian state media ahead of the visit.
He said the two countries were “actively developing cooperation in politics, economics, defence, expanding cultural exchanges, and fostering interpersonal interaction”.
“In essence, jointly doing everything to deepen bilateral cooperation and advance global development for the wellbeing of both nations,” Putin added.
Why Russia needs China
China has become an economic lifeline for Russia as the country’s economy has shifted to a wartime footing, with two-way trade between the countries more than doubling between 2020 and 2024, when it reached $237bn for the year.
But the relationship is also uneven. While China is Russia’s largest trading partner, Russia accounts for only about four percent of China’s total international trade. China’s economy is also vastly larger, and Beijing holds considerably more leverage in negotiations between the two sides.
Since the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has become increasingly reliant on Chinese technology and manufacturing. A recent Bloomberg report found Russia was sourcing more than 90 percent of its sanctioned technology imports from China, including components with military and dual-use applications vital to drone production and other defence industries.
China has also emerged as a crucial buyer of Russian oil and other energy products at a time when European markets have largely closed to Moscow in response to the Russia-Ukraine war. With Western sanctions restricting Russia’s options, the Kremlin has few viable alternatives to China’s scale of demand.
Analysts say the imbalance means Beijing is often able to negotiate from a position of strength, securing access to Russian oil and gas at discounted prices while expanding its influence over Moscow’s economic future.

Why China still needs Russia
While the relationship is uneven, it is not one-sided. Russia provides something increasingly valuable in a turbulent world: secure access to vast energy resources beyond vulnerable maritime trade routes.
The war surrounding Iran and disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have heightened Beijing’s concerns over energy security, given China’s heavy dependence on imported oil and gas passing through contested shipping lanes.
That has renewed attention on the proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, a long-delayed project expected to feature prominently in this week’s discussions.
If completed, the pipeline would transport 50 billion cubic metres of Russian gas annually to China via Mongolia, significantly expanding energy flows between the two countries.
But it is more than just an economic relationship. China also values Russia as a geopolitical partner. Both countries are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and frequently align diplomatically in opposition to US-led policies.
While analysts say China has been careful not to become formally tied to Moscow through a rigid military alliance, the two countries have still gradually reinforced their partnership through increasingly regular joint military exercises, including the “Joint Sea” naval drills that began in 2012.
Last year, China and Russia launched fresh naval drills in the Sea of Japan near the Russian port of Vladivostok, with exercises focused on submarine rescue, anti-submarine warfare, air defence, missile defence and maritime combat operations. Analysts say the drills help signal strategic alignment between Beijing and Moscow without the mutual defence commitments of a formal alliance.
Experts say the strength of the partnership lies in its flexibility. While Western governments have often portrayed the relationship as fragile and driven largely by a shared opposition to the West, analysts say, it may prove more durable because it is rooted in shared economic and strategic interests rather than ideology alone.
