Months after the blockade, Nepal signed a landmark transit agreement with China, giving the landlocked country an alternative route to the sea through Chinese territory.
An implementation protocol followed in 2019, although the facility has yet to be put into practical use.
China was already Nepal’s second-largest source of imports, accounting for about 13 per cent in 2015. A decade later, that share has risen to about 20 per cent, although India remains dominant at nearly 58 per cent.
The political determination produced by the blockade ultimately ran up against geography and economics. Chinese fuel was more expensive and difficult to transport across the Himalayas, while, by 2019, India offered a dedicated cross-border petroleum pipeline.
Kharel argued that successive Nepali governments had failed to make the investments needed to turn their long-standing diversification strategy into reliable northern connectivity.
“Despite the fact that in the span of over four decades China was rapidly growing, and all eyes of the world in terms of economic power was directed at China, we just kind of slept over that momentous change,” he said.
Even before the latest disruption, 50 to 60 per cent of Nepal’s imports from China travelled by sea to India and then overland into Nepal.
That is a route that typically takes more than twice as long as by land. For certain time-sensitive items like fresh food, there will be issues in the near term if land connectivity is hampered, Thapa said.
Small and medium businesses that cannot import in bulk may also suffer from higher prices or delays for their goods.
There are also likely to be supply constraints for Chinese EVs, which have surged in popularity in Nepal in recent years.
Chinese models accounted for about three-quarters of the value of Nepal’s EV imports last fiscal year, with 9,640 vehicles imported from China. Rasuwagadhi has been particularly important to that boom.
